Real and Represented

The knock-down on putting the distinction between 1 and 2, instead of between 2 and 3 (as Radford would want it), with regard to 1. a real situation before you, 2. a documentary representation of a real situation, and 3. a fictional representation situation, seems to me to be the following consideration.

First, there are two aspects to a situation: i. its nature, and ii. its reality. In all three cases mentioned above, what the nature of the situation is depends on how one would want to interpret it (anti-realism about theory). You don’t prove whether something is real, though, by way of interpretation (you can prove something false). Two, to prove that something is real you need a polymodal access to it, such as is provided by embodied, synchronous perception (entity-realism).

Thus, in all three cases we have to interpret the situation at hand, but only in the first case can we really be sure that it exists.

To be sure, the distinction between discussed here concerns the experiential awareness of the audience, and, hence, their emotional responses.

Locke, John. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Printed for Tho. Basset. (For some good argument to dinstinguish between unimodal and polymodal access of secondary and, respectively, primary qualities.)
Gerwen, Rob van. 1996. “Intimation and Tertiary Qualities.” Chapter 7 of Art and Experience, Volume XIV of Quaestiones Infinitae, 134–70. Utrecht: Dept. Philosophy.
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. (For the defence of anti-realism about theory and entity-realism).